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What FINRA Can Learn from  
Major League Baseball 
Ben Einbinder* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For over 150 years, baseball has captivated Americans and has 
cemented its place as the national pastime.1  When the game was invented in 
the early decades of the nineteenth century, it was played “on a strictly 
amateur basis.”2  By the mid-1850s, the baseball craze hit the New York 
metropolitan area, and professionalism inevitably found its way into the 
sport.3 
In 1869, the Cincinnati Red Stockings became the first fully 
professional baseball club, and the National Association of Base Ball Players 
became the sport’s first professional league in 1871.4  In 1875, The National 
Association of Base Ball Players became the National League of Baseball 
Clubs, the predecessor of today’s National League.5  Since the 1870s, 
professional baseball’s rising popularity, combined with the implementation 
of free agency and arbitration, has turned the game into a multibillion-dollar 
industry.6  Today, Major League Baseball (MLB) consists of thirty teams 
made up of over 700 players.7  Over the years, MLB has dealt with its fair 
share of employment disputes. 
 
*  Ben Einbinder is a J.D. candidate at Pepperdine University School of Law. 
 1. Kevin A. Rings, Baseball Free Agency and Salary Arbitration, 3 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 243, 244 (1987). 
 2. See id. 
 3. BENJAMIN G. RADER, BASEBALL: A HISTORY OF AMERICA’S GAME 9 (3d ed. 2008). 
 4. DEAN SULLIVAN, EARLY INNINGS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF BASEBALL, 1825–1908, 
73-87 (1997).  The National Association of Base Ball Players lasted from 1871 to 1875.  Id. at 83-
84. 
 5. See Rings, supra note 1, at 244. 
 6. See Nancy Kercheval, Major League Baseball Revenue Reaches Record, Attendance Falls, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 1, 2008, 9:13 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=asFEMjfiKA5s. 
 7. See Complete Baseball Team and Baseball Team Encyclopedias, BASEBALL-
REFERENCE.COM, http://www.baseball-reference.com/teams (last visited Mar. 6, 2012).  There are 
30 teams with 25 players on each team.  Id. 
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The securities industry is no different, and in 1986 the securities 
employment arbitration program was established.8  In the first twelve years 
of the program, roughly 3,200 employment awards were issued.9  In 2007, 
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) was established and 
assumed control of the dispute resolution programs formerly administered 
by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE).10 
“[FINRA] is the largest independent regulator for all securities firms 
doing business in the United States.”11  FINRA has over 3,000 employees 
that oversee nearly 4,500 brokerage firms, about 163,470 branch offices, and 
approximately 634,385 registered securities representatives.12  In the 
securities industry in the United States, FINRA administers the largest 
dispute resolution forum for investors and registered firms.13 
This article analyzes MLB’s final-offer arbitration system (the 
arbitration system) and advocates for its adoption in employment disputes in 
the finance industry.  Part II discusses the history and evolution of the 
arbitration system.  Part III analyzes the current state of the arbitration 
system and Part IV discusses its effects on player salaries and the 
implications of those affects on MLB organizations.  Part V discusses 
criticisms of the arbitration system, while Part VI discusses defenses of the 
system.  Part VII examines FINRA’s arbitration model for disputes in the 
securities industry.  Part VIII advocates for the use of final-offer arbitration 
to determine the amount of the awards for employment disputes in the 
securities industry.  Lastly, Part IX discusses the impact of implementing 
final-offer arbitration in FINRA employment disputes.  
II. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATION 
In 1879, following a dispute over a uniform, Jim O’Rourke decided to 
quit the Boston Beaneaters and sign on with the Providence team.14  In 
response, the owners of the major league teams met secretly and devised the 
 
 8. David B. Lipsky, Ronald L. Seeber & J. Ryan Lamare, The Arbitration of Employment 
Disputes in the Securities Industry: A Study of FINRA Awards, 1986-2008, J. DISP. RES., Feb.-Apr. 
2010, at 54. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See id. 
 11. About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, FINRA.ORG, 
http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA (last visited Mar. 6, 2012) [hereinafter FINRA]. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See Rings, supra note 1, at 245. 
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“reserve system” to prevent players from “jumping” from team to team.15  
Initially, the reserve system was simply a gentlemen’s agreement between 
owners that allowed each owner to produce a list of players that were “off-
limits” to the rest of the league.16  Several years later, the reserve system was 
formalized and a “reserve clause” was written into the contracts of all 
professional baseball players.17  Under the reserve system, if a player had a 
reserve clause in his contract, he was bound to that team for the duration of 
the contract and the succeeding season as well.18  If the player had a dispute 
with his employer, he was unable to seek employment with another team.19  
Many players likened the reserve system to a form of slavery; however, the 
system satisfied the owners’ desire to retain players as long as they were of 
value to the team, while also maintaining the freedom to release the players 
when they had lost their value.20 
The reserve system gave the owners complete leverage over of the 
players.  The unrest surrounding the reserve system led to three separate 
legal challenges, all of which made it to the U.S. Supreme Court.21  In 
Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional 
Baseball Clubs, the reserve clause was challenged by a rival league which 
was attempting to lure players away from the National League.22  Justice 
Holmes accepted the argument by the National League that the reserve 
system was a necessity, and upheld the legality of the system.23  Justice 
Holmes further held that the reserve clause did not violate antitrust laws 
because baseball was not a business engaging in interstate commerce.24 
 
 15. See id. 
 16. See id. 
 17. See id. 
 18. See id. at 246. 
 19. See id.  The only alternatives available to players were to accept whatever offer was made 
by the owner, hope for a trade, or seek employment outside of baseball.  Id. 
 20. See id. 
 21. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953); Fed. 
Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). 
 22. Fed. Baseball, 259 U.S. at 207. 
 23. See Rings, supra note 1, at 247. 
 24. Fed. Baseball, 259 U.S. at 208-09. 
 
The business is giving exhibitions of base ball, which are purely state affairs.  It is true 
that in order to attain for these exhibitions the great popularity that they have achieved, 
competitions must be arranged between clubs from different cities and States.  But the 
fact that in order to give the exhibitions the Leagues must induce free persons to cross 
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The second legal challenge to the reserve system came in Toolson v. 
New York Yankees.25  In Toolson, Earl Toolson objected to the reserve 
system because he was being assigned to different minor league teams 
within the Yankees organization and he believed he had a better chance 
making a major league roster elsewhere.26  The Court relied heavily on 
Federal Baseball and affirmed baseball’s exemption from the antitrust 
laws.27 
Following the Toolson decision, the players voted to unionize, leading 
to the creation of the Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) 
in 1954.28  Although the reserve system remained in place, the MLBPA 
began addressing issues like the pension fund, minimum salary, and player 
grievances under its first permanent, full-time director, Marvin Miller.29 
By 1967, the MLBPA persuaded the owners to form their own labor 
relations organization, the Player Relations Committee (PRC), to engage in 
collective bargaining with the union.30  In 1968, the MLBPA and the PRC 
created the 1968 Basic Agreement (Agreement), a landmark event in the 
history of baseball’s labor relations.31  Among other things, the Agreement 
increased the minimum salary by $4,000; whereas, the minimum salary had 
only increased $2,000 in the twenty years prior to Marvin Miller’s hiring in 
1966.32  The Agreement also created the right to formal grievance arbitration 
 
state lines and must arrange and pay for their doing so is not enough to change the 
character of the business. 
 
Id. 
 25. Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953). 
 26. Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 101 F. Supp. 93, 93 (S.D. Cal. 1951). 
 27. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357. 
 
The present cases ask us to overrule the prior decision and, with retrospective effect, hold 
the legislation applicable.  We think that if there are evils in this field which now warrant 
application to it of the antitrust laws it should be by legislation.  Without re-examination 
of the underlying issues, the judgments below are affirmed on the authority of Federal 
Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, supra, so 
far as that decision determines that Congress had no intention of including the business of 
baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust laws. 
 
Id. 
 28. Daniel C. Glazer, Can’t Anybody Here Run This Game? The Past, Present and Future of 
Major League Baseball, 9 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 339, 341 (1999). 
 29. See id. at 343-44. 
 30. LEE LOWENFISH, THE IMPERFECT DIAMOND: A HISTORY OF BASEBALL’S LABOR WARS 
203 (revised ed. 1991). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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and it created the Uniform Player’s Contract—the standard employment 
contract signed by all major league players—which could only be changed 
through collective bargaining.33 
The 1970 Basic Agreement reconfigured the arbitration process 
requiring a tripartite panel comprised of two partisan members and one 
neutral, who acted as the Chairman.34  The panel was given jurisdiction to 
resolve all disputes involving any agreement between “a Player and a Club,” 
and its rulings were legally binding on both sides.35 
The final legal challenge to the reserve system came in 1972 in Flood v. 
Kuhn.36  Curt Flood had been traded by the St. Louis Cardinals to the 
Philadelphia Phillies and he refused to report to the Phillies.37  Since the 
Toolson decision, there had been other forms of sports and entertainment 
determined not to be exempt from the antitrust laws;38 however, the Supreme 
Court again ruled that baseball was unique and was exempt from the 
antitrust laws, affirming the legality of the reserve system.39 
Despite their legal victory in Flood, the owners believed that 
congressional intervention was imminent and, as such, were more willing to 
compromise on changes to the reserve system in the 1973 Basic 
Agreement.40  The most significant concession was final-offer arbitration for 
salary disputes of all players with more than two years of major league 
service.41  The first salary arbitration hearing took place on February 11, 
1974 between pitcher Dick Woodson and the Minnesota Twins.42 
 
 33. Id.  The Commissioner decided the grievances.  Id.  Ultimately, the impartiality was 
questioned because the owners paid the Commissioner.  Id.  See also MARVIN MILLER, A WHOLE 
DIFFERENT BALL GAME: THE SPORT AND BUSINESS OF BASEBALL 97 (1991). 
 34. Basic Agreement, art. X (1970), available at 
http://www.bizofbaseball.com/docs/1970CBA.pdf. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). 
 37. Id. at 265. 
 38. See Rings, supra note 1, at 249. 
 39. Flood, 407 U.S. at 285. 
 40. Glazer, supra note 28, at 351. 
 41. Daniel R. Marburger, Whatever Happened to the “Good Ol’ Days”?, in STEE-RIKE FOUR!: 
WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE BUSINESS OF BASEBALL 7, 11 (Daniel R. Marburger ed., 1997).  Prior to 
implementing final-offer arbitration, the player’s only leverage was to hold out into the season or 
retire.  Id.  Final-offer arbitration allowed the player and the club to submit their best offers to a 
neutral arbitrator following an impasse in negotiations.  Id.  The arbitrator would then decide 
between the two offers. Id. 
 42. Ed Edmonds, A Most Interesting Part of Baseball’s Monetary Structure—Salary 
Arbitration in its Thirty-Fifth Year, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 1, 1 (2009).  Woodson won his 
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Following the 1973 Agreement, there were several grievances that 
would end up changing the game forever.  Prior to the 1974 season, Jim 
“Catfish” Hunter signed a one-year, $100,000 contract with the Oakland 
Athletics.43  Hunter requested that half of the amount be paid as regular 
salary and the other half be used to purchase a $50,000 non-taxable annuity 
in Hunter’s name.44  However, the club owner, Charles Finley, refused 
Hunter’s request because the payment would not be tax-deductible for 
Finley until Hunter collected on the annuity.45  As a result, the MLBPA filed 
a grievance on behalf of Hunter claiming that Finley’s refusal to purchase 
the annuity voided Hunter’s playing contract.46  In December 1974, 
arbitrator Peter Seitz ordered Finley to purchase Hunter’s annuity and 
declared Hunter free to contract with any club he wished.47  Hunter then 
signed an unprecedented five-year, $3.75 million contract with the New 
York Yankees.48  The result of the arbitration was a revelation among the 
other players of their true market value. 
In early 1974, Andy Messersmith signed a $90,000, one-year contract 
with the Los Angeles Dodgers and had an exceptionally good season.49  The 
following year, Messersmith requested a “no-trade” provision in his contract 
but was refused when the Dodgers unilaterally renewed his contract under 
Section 10(a) of the Uniform Player’s Contract.50  The MLBPA filed a 
grievance on behalf of Messersmith and Montreal Expos pitcher Dave 
McNally following the 1975 season, claiming that Section 10(a) only 
granted teams a one-year renewable option, after which players were free to 
negotiate with other teams.51  Despite being encouraged to settle by the 
arbitration panel, the owners ignored the suggestion and the panel ruled in 
favor of Messersmith and McNally.52  The ruling effectively granted free 
 
hearing when the arbitrator chose his $30,000 offer instead of the Twins’ $23,000 offer.  Id.  
Woodson was then traded to the New York Yankees where he was sent down to the minor leagues 
and never returned to the major leagues.  Id.  Woodson claimed he was “blackballed” because he 
used the arbitration process. Id. 
 43. See MILLER, supra note 33, at 227. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. at 228. 
 46. See id. at 231. 
 47. See id. at 233. 
 48. See id. at 237. 
 49. See id. at 241. 
 50. Id.  Section 10(a) provided, in relevant part: “If prior to the [beginning of the season], the 
Player and the Club have not agreed upon the terms of [a] contract, . . . the club shall have the right . 
. . to renew this contract for the period of one year on the same terms . . . .”  Uniform Player’s 
Contract, § 10(a) (1973) (incorporated as an appendix to the 1976 Basic Agreement). 
 51. See Glazer, supra note 28, at 353-54. 
 52. See id. at 355. 
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agency without a minimum service requirement as a player simply had to 
refuse to sign a new contract following the expiration of his previous 
contract, play out his option year, and become a free agent at the end of the 
season.53 
The Messersmith-McNally decision led to immediate changes to the 
structuring of the reserve system in the 1976 Basic Agreement.54  Under the 
new system, teams could reserve players with fewer than six years of major 
league service.55  After six years of major league service, players became 
free agents and were able to participate in a post-season “re-entry draft.”56  
Players, however, were limited to bids by up to twelve teams during the 
draft.57  Through the use of arbitration, the Messersmith-McNally decision 
truly set the stage for exponential growth in player salaries.58 
The two decades following the Messersmith-McNally decision were 
filled with conflict between the owners and the MLBPA.59  There were 
player strikes in 1981, 1985, and 1994 and an owners’ lockout in 1990.60  
The disputes ultimately led to the arbitration structure as it stands today.61 
III. OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT ARBITRATION SYSTEM 
The current salary structure in MLB separates players into three groups 
depending on major league service.62  The first group consists of players that 
are not yet eligible for arbitration and are bound to one team, similar to the 
 
 53. See id. at 356. 
 54. See id. 
 55. Basic Agreement, art. XVII(B) (1976), available at 
http://bizofbaseball.com/docs/1976CBARotate.pdf. 
 56. Id. at art. XVII(B), (C). 
 57. Id. 
 58. ANDREW S. ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS: A PROBING LOOK INSIDE THE BIG 
BUSINESS OF OUR NATIONAL PASTIME 76 (updated ed. 1994).  After fifteen years of free agency, the 
average player in 1991 earned forty-seven times the mean annual U.S. income.  Id. at 77. 
 59. See Glazer, supra note 28, at 358. 
 60. See id. at 358-64. 
 61. PAUL DICKSON, THE DICKSON BASEBALL DICTIONARY 736 (3d ed. 2009). 
 62. Basic Agreement, art. VI(F)(1) (2007-2011), available at 
http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf.  Major league service is calculated by the number of 
days a player is on the major league roster in a given year.  Id.  A year in the major leagues is 
defined as 172 days on the major league roster.  Id. 
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reserve system prior to the Messersmith-McNally decision.63  These players 
are typically paid a salary close to the league minimum.64 
The second group includes all players that have accrued enough service 
time to satisfy the requirements to become eligible for arbitration.65  Players 
become arbitration-eligible when they have accrued “a total of three or more 
years of Major League service, however accumulated, but with less than six 
years of Major League service.”66  A player may also be arbitration-eligible 
if he has 
[A]t least two but less than three years of Major League service . . . if: (a) he has 
accumulated at least 86 days of service during the immediately preceding season; and (b) 
he ranks in the top seventeen percent (17%) (rounded to the nearest whole number) in 
total service in the class of Players who have at least two but less than three years of 
Major League service, however accumulated, but with at least 86 days of service 
accumulated during the immediately preceding season.67 
Once a player becomes arbitration-eligible, he is then able to negotiate 
his salary with his club.68  Upon impasse, the player and the club submit 
their final offers to an impartial arbitration panel.69  The arbitration panel 
must select one of the two offers submitted and cannot pick an amount in-
between.70  The Basic Agreement sets forth the criteria the panel may 
consider when deciding between the offers.71  The panel’s decision is 
 
 63. See Edmonds, supra note 42, at 7. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See id. 
 66. Basic Agreement, art. VI(F)(1) (2007-2011). 
 67. Id. at art. VI(F)(1).  This category of players is commonly known in baseball as the “Super 
Twos.”  Edmonds, supra note 42, at 7. 
 68. Edmonds, supra note 42, at 7.  The arbitration system is the dispute resolution system that 
the MLBPA and the owners agreed to use when the negotiations reach an impasse.  Id. 
 69. See Rings, supra note 1, at 254. 
 70. See id. 
 71. Basic Agreement, art. VI(F)(12)(a) (2007-2011).  The criteria includes: 
 
[T]he quality of the Player’s contribution to his Club during the past season (including 
but not limited to his overall performance, special qualities of leadership and public 
appeal), the length and consistency of his career contribution, the record of the Player’s 
past compensation, comparative baseball salaries (see paragraph (13) below for 
confidential salary data), the existence of any physical or mental defects on the part of the 
Player, and the recent performance record of the Club including but not limited to its 
League standing and attendance as an indication of public acceptance (subject to the 
exclusion stated in subparagraph (b)(i) below). 
 
Id.  The panel cannot consider evidence related to the following: 
 
(i) The financial position of the Player and the Club; (ii) Press comments, testimonials or 
similar material bearing on the performance of either the Player or the Club, except that 
8
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binding on the player and his club only for the season immediately following 
the hearing.72  A player may submit to arbitration up to three times prior to 
reaching free agency.73 
The third group includes all players with at least six years of service 
who have attained free agent status.74  Upon the expiration of a free agent’s 
contract, a club can offer arbitration to the player.75  If the player accepts the 
offer to arbitrate, he is considered a signed player for the next season.76  If 
the player rejects the offer to arbitrate, he then becomes a free agent 
classified as either a Type A, Type B, or unranked player depending on the 
statistical rubric set forth in the Basic Agreement.77  The classifications 
determine what level of compensation the player’s former club receives as a 
result of the player’s election of free agency.78  Once a player has attained 
free agent status, he is able to seek the highest offer on the open market.79 
IV. THE AFFECTS OF THE ARBITRATION SYSTEM IN MLB 
Since its inception, the implementation of final-offer arbitration has 
substantially affected MLB.  When the owners and the MLBPA included 
arbitration in the 1973 Basic Agreement, they envisioned a system that 
 
recognized annual Player awards for playing excellence shall not be excluded; (iii) Offers 
made by either Player or Club prior to arbitration; (iv) The cost to the parties of their 
representatives, attorneys, etc.; (v) Salaries in other sports or occupations. 
 
Id.  It should also be noted that the arbitration panel is not allowed to issue a written opinion of their 
reasoning behind choosing the offer they chose.  Id. at art. VI(F)(5). 
 72. Basic Agreement, art. VI(F) (2007-2011).  A club cannot submit an offer less than 80% of 
the player’s previous year’s salary unless the player won a salary arbitration in the immediately 
preceding year which increased the player’s prior year’s salary by an excess of 50%.  Id. at art. 
VI(F)(3)(c)(i)-(ii). 
 73. Id. at art. VI(F). 
 74. See Edmonds, supra note 42, at 8. 
 75. Basic Agreement, art. XX(B) (2007-2011).  The same criteria are used from Article VI.  
Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id.  Type A players are those who rank in the upper twenty percent of their respective 
position group, whereas, Type B players are those who rank in the upper forty percent but not in the 
upper twenty percent of their respective position group.  Id.  All players not considered Type A or 
Type B are classified as unranked free agents.  Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Edmonds, supra note 42, at 8.  Inherent in the term “free agent” is the individual 
player’s freedom from any team. 
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would lead to fewer disputes and more settlements.80  The parties chose 
final-offer arbitration because the high level of risk inherent in the all-or-
nothing procedure incentivizes parties to negotiate in good faith and settle 
prior to a hearing.81  The theory behind final-offer arbitration is that it 
promotes a “convergence” of the two positions in the arbitration as the 
parties will make concessions to make their offers more reasonable to the 
arbitration panel.82  The two sides are ultimately more likely to bargain in 
hopes of reaching an agreement prior to the hearing if they fear that the 
arbitrator may view the other side’s offer as more reasonable.83 
Statistically, MLB’s arbitration system has accomplished its goals.  
Since arbitration was incorporated into the 1973 Basic Agreement, 84.32% 
of salary arbitration cases filed settled prior to actually being arbitrated.84  
Only twice has the number of arbitrations heard exceeded 50% of the cases 
filed.85  In 2009, more than 97% of the arbitration-eligible players settled 
prior to a hearing.86 
Along with an increase in the number of settlements, player salaries 
have also increased since the introduction of arbitration.  In fact, the average 
annual negotiated settlement between 1974 and 1993 resulted in a gain 
ranging from 33% to 110% over the previous year’s salary.87  In 1993, 
players who prevailed in their arbitration hearings gained a 174% salary 
increase, whereas players who “lost” averaged a 54% increase in salary.88  
As a result, teams have started negotiating multiyear contracts for highly 
talented players to avoid the arbitration process.89  This allows teams to 
 
 80. Thomas J. Hopkins, Arbitration: A Major League Effect on Players’ Salaries, 2 SETON 
HALL J. SPORT L. 301, 306 (1992). 
 81. Adam Primm, Note, Salary Arbitration Induced Settlement in Major League Baseball: The 
New Trend, 17 SPORTS LAW. J. 73, 87 (2010). 
 82. See id. at 88. 
 83. Jonathan M. Conti, The Effect of Salary Arbitration on Major League Baseball, 5 SPORTS 
LAW. J. 221, 231 (1998). 
 84. See Primm, supra note 81, at 92. 
 85. See id.  The only two years were 1974 and 1978.  Id. 
 86. Maury Brown, Detailed Report: 2009 MLB Salary Arbitration by Club, Position, and 
More, THE BIZ OF BASEBALL (Feb. 24, 2009, 12:54 PM),  
http://www.bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2982:detailed-
report-2009-mlb-salary-arbitration-by-club-position-and-more&catid=66:free-agnecy-and-
trades&Itemid=153.  Only three of the 111 arbitration-eligible players failed to settle prior to a 
hearing.  Id. 
 87. See Conti, supra note 83, at 235. 
 88. Vittorio Vella, Comment, Swing and a Foul Tip: What Major League Baseball Needs to 
Do to Keep Its Small Market Franchises Alive at the Arbitration Plate, 16 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & 
ENT. L. 317, 326 (2006). 
 89. See Primm, supra note 81, at 93.  In 2009, 15 of the 111 players who filed for arbitration 
received multiyear contracts in lieu of the one-year contract that typically results from arbitration.  
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negotiate with players before they have reached their full playing potential 
and, thus, their full earning potential.90  However, the arbitration system has 
forced teams to bear the risk of declining future performance or injury or 
face the potential annual salary increases associated with arbitration.91 
V. CRITICISMS OF MLB’S ARBITRATION SYSTEM 
Critics of MLB’s arbitration system tend to focus on the damaging 
effects the increase in player salaries has had on the game.92  First, they note 
that final-offer arbitration disproportionately favors player interests.93  
Arbitration-eligible players receive an increase in their salaries regardless of 
whether or not they prevail in their hearings.94  In 2009, the average increase 
in salary among arbitration-eligible players was 143%.95 
Another criticism of the arbitration system is that the differential 
between player offers and team offers has widened greatly since the 
system’s inception.96  In 1974, player offers were 20% higher than their team 
offers.97  In 1993, however, player offers jumped to 63% higher than team 
offers.98  The divergence of offers has made the high-risk procedure even 
more unpredictable.99 
 
Benjamin A. Tulis, Final-Offer “Baseball” Arbitration: Contexts, Mechanics & Applications, 20 
SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 85, 91 (2010). 
 90. See Primm, supra note 81, at 93. 
 91. See id. at 97.  The player also bears the risk that his market value will increase beyond the 
value of his multiyear contract as he continues to develop his talent.  Id. 
 92. See generally Vella, supra note 88; Josh Chetwynd, Play Ball? An Analysis of Final-Offer 
Arbitration, Its Use in Major League Baseball and Its Potential Applicability to European Football 
Wage and Transfer Disputes, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 109 (2009); Bibek Das, Salary Arbitration 
and the Effects on Major League Baseball and Baseball Players, 1 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 55 (2003); John P. Gillard, Jr., Note, An Analysis of Salary Arbitration in 
Baseball: Could a Failure to Change the System be Strike Three for Small-Market Franchises?, 3 
SPORTS LAW. J. 125 (1996). 
 93. See Vella, supra note 88, at 326. 
 94. See Das, supra note 92, at 57. 
 95. See Chetwynd, supra note 92, at 132. 
 96. See Gillard, supra note 92, at 131.  Player offers have increased at a much higher rate than 
team offers since the implementation of arbitration.  Id. 
 97. See id. 
 98. See id. 
 99. See id. at 132. 
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Final-offer arbitration has also been criticized because of the adversarial 
nature of the proceeding.100  When advocating for their offer, teams are 
forced to disclose degrading and detrimental evidence of the player’s 
character and conduct to persuade the arbitration panel to accept their 
offer.101  Players may feel betrayed following an arbitration hearing, 
regardless of the outcome, and may perform below their potential as a 
result.102  The detrimental effects to the relationship may cause players to 
refuse to re-sign with the team during their free agency years or even request 
a trade during the upcoming season.103 
Finally, opponents of the MLB arbitration system have criticized the 
system because of the way it has enlarged the disparity between small- and 
large-market teams.104  Arbitrators are not able to consider the financial 
status of the player or the team when making their decision.105  Large-market 
teams, however, are typically willing to pay higher free agent salaries than 
small-market teams, and these salaries are taken into consideration in 
arbitration hearings.106  Therefore, MLB’s arbitration system imposes an 
economic loss on small-market franchises by forcing them to sign players 
for salaries exceeding their value to the team.107 
VI. DEFENSES OF MLB’S ARBITRATION SYSTEM 
Proponents of MLB’s arbitration system highlight the fact that 
arbitration works quickly and fairly while encouraging “parties to adopt a 
realistic, good faith bargaining position.”108  Even opponents to arbitration 
cannot deny that the program has encouraged pre-arbitration settlements.  
Since 1988, 89.23% of salary arbitration cases have settled prior to a 
hearing.109 
Supporters of arbitration argue that MLB’s arbitration system should not 
be blamed for the increases in player salaries.110  In recent years, the average 
 
 100. See Das, supra note 92, at 58. 
 101. See id. 
 102. See id. 
 103. See id. 
 104. See Gillard, supra note 92, at 134. 
 105. Basic Agreement, art. VI(F) (2007-2011). 
 106. See Vella, supra note 88, at 328. 
 107. See id. 
 108. Frederick N. Donegan, Examining the Role of Arbitration in Professional Baseball, 1 
SPORTS LAW. J. 183, 204 (1994).  The arbitrators must reach a decision no later than twenty-four 
hours following the close of the hearing.  Basic Agreement, art. VI(F) (2007-2011). 
 109. See Primm, supra note 81, at 92. 
 110. Matt Mullarkey, Note, For the Love of the Game: A Historical Analysis and Defense of 
Final Offer Arbitration in Major League Baseball, 9 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 234, 247 (2010). 
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player salary has exceeded the average arbitration award.111  This suggests 
that salary increases should be attributed to a combination of arbitration and 
free agency.112  Some commentators suggest that if either free agency or 
arbitration had been implemented independently of the other, player salaries 
would not have increased as dramatically.113  Arbitration backers also 
attribute the increase in salaries resulting from arbitration to the fact that 
players are underpaid during their first three seasons in the major leagues.114 
With respect to the small-market teams, advocates of arbitration argue 
that the system actually benefits those teams.115  Arbitration allows small-
market teams to negotiate multiyear contracts without the threat of losing 
their better players to other teams through free agency.116  Multiyear 
contracts allow small-market teams to hold on to a player into his early years 
of free agency while paying him less than his free agent market value.117 
Many of the benefits of MLB’s arbitration system are a product of the 
system’s final-offer structure.  If similar arbitration schemes were utilized in 
other industries, like the securities industry, the benefits would likely follow. 
VII. OVERVIEW OF THE FINRA EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
PROGRAM 
In the securities industry, Rule 13200 of the Code of Arbitration 
Procedure for Industry Disputes requires a dispute to be arbitrated if it 
“arises out of the business activities of a ‘member’ or an ‘associated person’ 
and is between or among members, associated persons, or members and 
associated persons.”118  Members are brokers and dealers, and the employees 
 
 111. See id. at 248. 
 112. See Gillard, supra note 92, at 133. 
 113. See id.  Abolishing arbitration would create an increase in the supply of free agent players 
each season.  Id.  According to basic economic principles, an increase in the supply would cause the 
market price of free agents to decrease.  Id.  Implementing arbitration without free agency would 
have restricted the open market causing salaries to decrease.  Id. 
 114. See Primm, supra note 81, at 107.  A player’s salary during his first year of arbitration 
eligibility should be viewed not just as compensation for the upcoming season, but also as the 
compensation he should have received during his first three seasons.  See Mullarkey, supra note 110, 
at 248. 
 115. See Mullarkey, supra note 110, at 249. 
 116. See id. 
 117. See id.  Young players have a large incentive to accept a multiyear agreement because of 
the day-to-day risks involved with playing baseball.  Id.  The average MLB career only lasts a little 
more than five years.  Id. 
 118. See Lipsky, Seeber & Lamare, supra note 8, at 54. 
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in FINRA employment cases are brokers registered with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC).119  These employees are authorized to 
recommend and execute buy-sell orders, known as registered 
representatives.120 
FINRA arbitrations commence when an employee files an initial 
statement of claim with the Director of FINRA Dispute Resolution.121  The 
arbitration then proceeds similar to a traditional court proceeding, allowing 
the respondent to provide an answer to the claim or file a motion to dismiss 
the arbitration.122  Following the initial filings, the parties are able to select 
the arbitrators through a process of striking and ranking the arbitrators on 
lists generated by a computer system.123  Once the arbitrators have been 
selected, the parties participate in a prehearing conference to set the ground 
rules for the case.124  Unless the parties settle, withdraw, or the case has been 
dismissed, the case will then proceed to a hearing.125  The arbitration panel is 
required to provide a written decision and is given full discretionary power 
when deciding the arbitration award.126  Following a decision, parties to 
FINRA arbitration cases may have the arbitration award vacated under 
certain circumstances.127 
 
 119. See id. 
 120. See id. 
 121. FINRA CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE FOR INDUS. DISPUTES R. 13300 (2011).  The 
FINRA rules require that claims be filed within six years of the occurrence or event giving rise to the 
claim.  Id. at R. 13206. 
 122. Id. at R. 13302-14. 
 123. Id. at R. 13400. 
 124. Id. at R. 13500.  During the prehearing conference, the arbitration panel typically sets 
discovery, briefing, deadlines for motions, scheduling for subsequent sessions, and other preliminary 
matters.  Id. 
 125. Id. at R. 13600.  The parties may also elect a simplified arbitration proceeding if the 
arbitration involves a claim under $25,000.  Id. at R. 13800.  The simplified arbitrations are 
administered by a single arbitrator and no hearings are held unless requested by one of the parties.  
Id.  There is also an expedited procedure for cases involving a claim that an associate failed to pay 
money owed on a promissory note.  Id. at R. 13806. 
 126. Id. at R. 13904. 
 127. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2009).  Circumstances include: 
 
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means; (2) where there 
was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the 
arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient 
cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or 
of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; (4) 
where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a 
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Between 1986 and 2008, the FINRA arbitration cases can be separated 
into five categories: (1) cases where employees claimed the employer denied 
them compensation allegedly owed; (2) cases where employees claimed the 
employer had defamed them in some fashion; (3) cases where employees 
claimed they were wrongfully terminated; (4) cases where employees 
claimed their employer breached the contract; and (5) cases where 
employees made a claim of statutory discrimination against the employer.128  
Every case involved the employee presenting the arbitrator with a monetary 
figure and the employer taking the position that the arbitrator should not 
award the employee any money at all.129 
Employees were awarded a monetary amount in 61% of the cases, and 
the average award across all cases was nearly $146,000.130  The average, 
however, is elevated because there were a handful of large awards given 
during this period.131  In fact, one employee was awarded over $27 million in 
2001.132  However, this case was an anomaly as the median amount claimed 
in FINRA arbitrations was $375,000, and the median amount awarded was 
only $1,000.133  Employee awards were greater than 50% of what they 
claimed only 20% of the time.134 
The FINRA arbitration process has proven to be time consuming as the 
average amount of time between the filing of the claim and the issuance of 
an award was about seventeen months.135 
VIII. A CASE FOR FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATION IN FINRA EMPLOYMENT 
DISPUTES 
Employment arbitrations in FINRA can logically be split into two 
processes: determining liability and determining the amount of the award.136  
 
 128. See Lipsky, Seeber & Lamare, supra note 8, at 55.  The distribution of cases was 28%, 
27.4%, 13.5%, 8.4%, and 17.1% respectively.  Id.  Pursuant to the FINRA rules, however, statutory 
employment discrimination claims are not required to be arbitrated.  FINRA CODE OF ARBITRATION 
PROCEDURE FOR INDUS. DISPUTES R. 13201 (2011). 
 129. See Lipsky, Seeber & Lamare, supra note 8, at 55. 
 130. See id. 
 131. See id. 
 132. See id. 
 133. See id. 
 134. See id. at 57. 
 135. See id. 
 136. Interview with Robert A. Uhl, Attorney and Arbitrator, Aidikoff, Uhl & Bakhtiari, in 
Beverly Hills, Cal. (Feb. 23, 2011).  Mr. Uhl has appeared on Fox News and has been quoted on 
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In cases where liability is found, the majority of the time is spent 
determining the amount of the award.137  This article advocates for requiring 
the use of final-offer arbitration only to determine the amount of the 
award.138 
Employment disputes in the securities industry are ripe for the use of 
final-offer arbitration for several reasons.  First, final-offer arbitration will 
incentivize claimants to make more reasonable claims once liability has been 
found.139  Between 1986 and 2008, the median amount awarded in FINRA 
employment cases was only a quarter of a percent of the amount claimed.140  
The high risk nature of final-offer arbitration would force parties to re-
evaluate what their cases are really worth before submitting their final offers 
to the arbitration panel.141  If a party truly believes he has a strong case, the 
process should not affect his offers. 
Adopting final-offer arbitration would also increase the rate of 
settlement in FINRA employment disputes.142  By forcing parties to submit 
more reasonable offers, the system creates a more realistic bargaining 
zone.143  In turn, this would promote more settlements due to the risk 
involved with requiring the arbitration panel to select one party’s offer or the 
other.144  Again, parties who believe they have a strong case will not be 
deterred from presenting their award amount to the arbitration panel.145 
Another major benefit of using final-offer arbitration would be a 
decrease in the costs of arbitration.146  While a direct application of the MLB 
timetable may not be appropriate,147 as FINRA cases may present more 
 
securities matters by The Wall Street Journal, Registered Representative magazine, MarketWatch, 
and other members of the national and local press.  Id.  Mr. Uhl was also recognized as a 2005, 
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011 Southern California Super Lawyer.  Id.  The majority of 
Mr. Uhl’s experience with FINRA arbitrations is in investor arbitrations.  Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Currently, parties have the choice to settle their case at any time throughout the arbitration 
process.  FINRA CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE FOR INDUS. DISPUTES R. 13701 (2011).  
Parties can also choose to use final-offer arbitration if both sides are in agreement.  Id. at R. 13105. 
 139. See Rings, supra note 1, at 255 (“The practical effect of this system is that both sides have 
incentive to keep the figures they submit within reason.  If one proposal is too extreme, the other 
wins almost by default.”). 
 140. See Lipsky, Seeber & Lamare, supra note 8, at 56. 
 141. See Primm, supra note 81, at 87. 
 142. See id. at 91. 
 143. See id. at 82. 
 144. In 2009, only 3% of the MLB arbitration cases went to a hearing.  Brown, supra note 86. 
 145. See Primm, supra note 81, at 87. 
 146. Presumably, less time spent in arbitration will lead to lower costs. 
 147. Parties in MLB arbitration are required to submit their offers between January 5 and 
January 15 of the given year.  Basic Agreement, art. VI(F) (2007-2011).  The hearings are then 
scheduled to be held between February 1 and February 20 with a decision coming within twenty-
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complex claims, the arbitration process would undoubtedly be expedited by 
narrowing the arbitration panel’s decision to two offers.148  Expediting the 
process will lead to a reduction in incidental costs and attorneys fees 
associated with the arbitration process.149 
The main criticisms of MLB’s final-offer arbitration system are specific 
to issues that are unique to MLB.150  Therefore, the benefits of adopting 
mandatory final-offer arbitration in the determination of award amounts 
would likely outweigh any potential negative consequences. 
IX. THE IMPACT OF IMPLEMENTING FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATION IN FINRA 
EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES 
If FINRA adopted the requirement of using final-offer arbitration for 
employment disputes, there would be a significant impact on the current 
arbitration system.  It is important to understand that adding final-offer 
arbitration to the current FINRA arbitration program would not lead to a 
sacrifice in justice.  This article does not suggest that final-offer arbitration 
should be used in the determination of liability.151  Therefore, employers and 
employees will still be entitled to the same level of procedural due process 
as the current program. 
By limiting the choices for the arbitration panel, the use of final-offer 
arbitration in the determination of the award amount will reduce the length 
of the arbitration process.  As previously stated, the average FINRA 
arbitration case took nearly seventeen months from the filing of the claim to 
the issuance of an award.152  If employment arbitration cases resemble 
investor cases, in terms of the amount of time used to determine the amount 
 
four hours following the close of the hearing.  Id.  The maximum amount of time between 
submitting offers and receiving a decision is never longer than eight weeks.  Id. 
 148. Although MLB’s exact timetable may not be appropriate, FINRA could impose a similar 
time limit once liability has been determined.  See supra note 148. 
 149. See Lipsky, Seeber & Lamare, supra note 8, at 56.  One case cost a party over $700,000 in 
attorney’s fees.  Id.  Not to mention the considerable amount of costs incurred by diverting company 
resources away from day to day tasks. 
 150.  See supra Part V.  The only criticism that might apply would be the potential for 
divergence in offers.  See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 151. It should be noted that the determination of liability is inherently similar to a final-offer 
arbitration structure.  The arbitration panel is forced to decide between two choices: liability or no 
liability. 
 152. See Lipsky, Seeber & Lamare, supra note 8, at 33. 
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of the award, adopting final-offer arbitration should result in a significant 
reduction in the overall length of the arbitration. 
Another probable impact of requiring final-offer arbitration in the 
determination of the award amount would be an increase in settlement.  The 
high-risk nature of final-offer arbitration forces parties to realistically 
evaluate their case and present reasonable offers to the arbitration panel.  An 
increase in realistic offers will ultimately lead to more realistic bargaining 
zones.  In turn, the combination of a high-risk procedure and realistic 
bargaining zones will lead to increased settlement.153 
The most significant impact of requiring final-offer arbitration will be 
decreased costs and expenses.  The fundamental characteristics of final-offer 
arbitration are designed to curtail the length of the arbitration.154  Reducing 
the time needed to resolve the dispute will lead to a reduction in the costs of 
the arbitrators and a reduction in attorneys’ fees.  Additionally, the excess 
time and resources being used in arbitration under the current system could 
be reallocated to benefit both the employer and the employee involved in the 
case. 
Overall, requiring final-offer arbitration in FINRA employment disputes 
to determine the amount of the award is likely to have a significant, positive 
impact on the parties involved. 
X. CONCLUSION 
For nearly forty years, MLB has used final-offer arbitration to resolve 
salary disputes between players and clubs.  MLB’s arbitration system has 
proven to be both efficient and cost effective.  While the current FINRA 
arbitration procedure has proven to be a viable alternative to the traditional 
litigation process, parties would likely benefit if final-offer arbitration was 
required in the determination of the award amount.  Implementing final-offer 
arbitration will lead to shorter arbitrations, more settlements, and lower 
costs, while ensuring justice for those involved. 
 
 
 153. As previously discussed, Major League Baseball has experienced settlement rates over 
97% in recent years.  Brown, supra note 86. 
 154. The arbitration panel is limited to two choices. 
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